
Policing and Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland (HC 333-vi)Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 13 May 2008 |
Evidence given by Sir Alasdair Fraser (Director), and Mr James Scholes, (Senior Assistant Director, Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland); Sir Hugh Orde (Chief Constable), Mr Alistair Finlay (Assistant Chief Constable), Mr Peter Sheridan (Assistant Chief Constable, Head of Crime Operations, PSNI); Mr John Brannigan, (Head of Intelligence, Historical Enquiries Team).
Q526 Mr. Dave Anderson: Sir Hugh, it is good to see you again. In the written submission you sent us you mentioned your concerns about the information management procedures of the various inquiries and the fact they do not provide sufficient protection. Can you expand on that?
Sir Hugh Orde: Yes, I can. It is one of the key issues that causes me concern. This is no specific criticism of inquiries and the role they have been asked to do, it is the fact that I am losing control of more and more secret and extremely sensitive material which includes the names of covert human intelligence sources which historically, of course, would have been recruited on the clear understanding their names would be retained by the Police Service and would never go outside that control. None of my officers can ever say that ethically again because it is not right in inquiries like this and the Ombudsman gives powers to require that information to be divulged. We expressed those concerns in writing to all the inquiries at the start and sought to make sure processes and procedures were in place to minimise the impact, but the fact is you lose control when it goes outside the organisation. Likewise, the Ombudsman who, in fairness, has a very sophisticated and secure system for document retention that mirrors ours to the highest level, so it can be done but it is very expensive, of course. The long-term implications of this, in my judgment, and it is a judgment, are, if you look at the current threat to the United Kingdom, will we be able to successfully recruit sources, young men and women, from the communities where these current terrorists are being drawn from and radicalised who may be 20 now, so in 20 years' time, come a public inquiry, will only be in their 40s and their identities will not be secure. I think that has huge implications, which is why we feel it is very important. The risk is compromise and the wider the audience then the wider the risk, it is as simple as that. I do not know if Peter wants to expand.
Mr Sheridan: It is very difficult for people to sign up to be covert human intelligence sources at the best of times and one of the guarantees we used to give them in the past was that their identities would remain confidential, but we cannot do that any more. In the contract with that covert human intelligence source it becomes more and more difficult to persuade them that their identities will always remain secret. It stretches further into the courts, PII and protecting identities of informants in investigations.
Q527 Lady Hermon: Picking up on what Sir Hugh just said about the serious implications that are not just confined to Northern Ireland but our dealing with al-Qaeda and right across the United Kingdom, that is the point you are making?
Sir Hugh Orde: I think it has national and international implications. The other side is what agencies will be prepared to deal with us from outside if they feel they cannot be protected. There ways of minimising the risk and I think that we need to be confident when that material is outwith our control those risks are minimised, and I think there are certain standards that need to be maintained. It is a big issue.
Q528 Mr Murphy: Sir Hugh, have there actually been any incidents of covert human intelligence sources being identified as a result of public inquiries to date?
Sir Hugh Orde: Not to date, and likewise in prosecutions. We will step back, much to our frustration on many occasions, when the disclosure rules force us either to withdraw or divulge a source under Article 2. It is really a very simple, albeit frustrating, decision: you step back.
Q529 Mr Murphy: Just to follow on from that. One of the powers the Secretary of State has is to prevent the publication of evidence being published that would normally be placed in front of the inquiry. You are on record as saying to us that you thought it would place the minister in "an invidious position of seeming to intervene in the inquiry".
Sir Hugh Orde: It is a matter for the minister really, but I think it must be difficult if you set up an inquiry, a public inquiry, albeit in the Inquiries Act the word "public" does not feature in it, to be as public and as open as possible and then you are the same person who says, "I am sorry you can't hear this bit". In terms of public confidence in the process that does not seem to make sense to me.
Q530 Mr Murphy: But if that particular piece of information is to protect the very people you have just described, if he does not make the decision then who should?
Sir Hugh Orde: One could argue the judge of the inquiry might. There is a debate around this currently.
Mr Finlay: It is a legal debating issue. What we see at the moment is the traditional PII route and the legislative route that is in the Inquiries Act and we have got Lord MacLean particularly in the Billy Wright Inquiry who believes that he cannot and should not be the arbiter around that. He believes the Secretary of State is the right person to do it. Equally, the Secretary of State would have a view, we think, that he is not the arbiter because it has been provided for in the legislation that the chairman would do it. It has never come to fruition as yet because everything that we have had to deal with has been negotiated because we know about this issue. It is a grey area and an area which is uncertain and our position would be that it does not need to be uncertain, it could have that certainty if they clarified it.
Q531 Mr. Dave Anderson: Are you saying the certainty would come if you had the same sort of relationship you have got with the Ombudsman where the systems in the inquiries were the same as your systems?
Mr Finlay: There are two different things there. One is the clarification between a system whereby there is the granting of immunity over the release of that information to another body and the other is the framework of controls round the storage and management of information once it goes outwith our control. Our concern about inquiries is we have very strict regimes of control of the information and we are subject to oversight and inspection on that; the inquiries are not. The inquiries have been reluctant to engage in a process where they would give us assurances as to what that framework looks like. Although we tried at the beginning to get Memorandums of Understanding to see how this would work, fairly understandably the inquiries at that stage were reluctant to sign up to something which would appear to perhaps fetter their scope.
This is an uncorrected transcript of evidence taken in public and reported to the House. The transcript has been placed on the internet on the authority of the Committee. Neither witnesses nor Members have had the opportunity to correct the record. The transcript is not yet an approved formal record of these proceedings.
The full transcript may be read here.
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